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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Patents are classic examples of real options: a patent holder has the option to develop
certain types of products, or to license the technology, or to use it as an input for further
research (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). In an early renewal study Pakes (1986) models the
patent as an option to renew in patent regimes where renewal fees are required. However,
less work has been done modeling the enforceability decision in patents.
Several theoretical papers examine patenting decisions using a real options approach.
Reiss (1998) models the decisions of ﬁrms to develop and/or patent an innovation when
competition arrives stochastically. The paper explicitly examines the trade-oﬀ between
patents and trade-secrets as modes of protection, and introduces some uncertainty in the
patent right, in that competition may develop a substitute technology that does not infringe
the patent. Takalo and Kanniainen (2000) and Weeds (2002) develop models investigating
the patenting decision. Their models ﬁnd that costly patenting may delay the development
of an innovation, even in the face of competition. Neither paper explicitly models the patent
enforcement process; however, Takalo and Kanniainen (2000) acknowledge that there are
enforcement costs (because of infringers), and they incorporate them into the general cost
of patenting.
Bloom and VanReenen (2002) adapt empirical patent valuation models (Pakes 1985,
Pakes 1986) to explain the timing of the development of patented innovations, and the value
of innovating ﬁrms. Since the technology is subject to uncertainty, and since development
expenditure is irreversible, patents are real options. Bloom and VanReenen (2002) model
the value of a ﬁrm as the sum of the value of its developed patents and its options to develop,
where the proﬁt from patents (whether developed or not) evolves stochastically. They ﬁnd
that higher market uncertainty raises the value of patent options, but decreases the impact
of patents on productivity. The model of Bloom and VanReenen (2002), as well as most
1models in the theoretical literature, treat the patent holder as having exclusive rights to
develop a technology.
However, any option on the patented technology presupposes an enforceable property
right. The fundamental value of a patent right is the right to exclude others from using the
technology. Since enforcement is imperfect and costly, the right to exclude becomes the right
to sue with some probability of success. In patents, both the scope of the technology and the
validity of the patent can come into question (Schweizer 1989, Meurer 1989, Llobet 2000,
Marco 2000). Empirical work in patent litigation shows that more valuable patents are more
likely to be enforced through lawsuits (Lanjouw 1998, Lanjouw and Lerner 1998, Harhoﬀ,
Scherer and Vopel 1999, Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001), and the imperfect enforceability
of patents aﬀects patenting behavior (Lerner 1995, Hall and Ziedonis 2001) and industry
structure (Marco and Rausser 2002).
Some research has been done exploring the option value of litigation in breach of con-
tract. Cornell (1990) investigates the use of option pricing in estimating damages. However,
his model does not explain the incidence of litigation.
In this paper, I treat the patent as an option to bring a lawsuit against an alleged
infringer. Just like ﬁnancial options, the option to sue need not be exercised in order for it
to have value. Thus, the value of a patent is a function of the enforceability of the property
right.
In the analysis below, I present a simple real options model where there is uncertainty
over the validity of a patent. Section (2) presents the basic framework of patents as options.
Section (3) discusses the results for inﬁnitely-lived patents and Section (4) examines ﬁnitely-
lived patents. I characterize the value functions and exercise boundaries for both types of
patents. While inﬁnitely-lived patents are unrealistic,1 they are useful from a theoretical
perspective because the inﬁnite time horizon enables an analytic solution, which lends itself
better to comparative statics. Additionally, if the time horizon is ﬁnite but long, then
the diﬀerence between the inﬁnite and ﬁnite cases will be small at the beginning of the
patent’s life. To understand how patent value and the litigation decision change over time,
2it is important to develop a solution for the ﬁnite horizon case, which involves numerical
methods.
In Section (5) I investigate the incidence of patent litigation, and Section (6) uses nu-
merical methods and simulations to develop some testable implications about the timing
and incidence of patent litigation. In Section (7), I compare simulated data to patent litiga-
tion data, and I ﬁnd that while litigated patents tend to be valuable according to standard
measures, they are not the most valuable patents. Section (8) concludes with some policy
implications.
2 Model
In the US, patents are not born with certain validity when issued by the Patent and Trade-
mark Oﬃce (PTO). In enforcing a patent right against alleged infringers, it is quite common
to encounter a “validity defense” or a validity countersuit, the success of which means inva-
lidity for the patent right. That is, patent enforcement is risky since the patent holder may
lose its entire patent. Thus, the opportunity cost can be steep. When these opportunity
costs are high, higher levels of infringement will be accommodated before the option to sue
is exercised. In order to formally model this decision, I begin with a very simple framework
where beliefs about patent validity evolve stochastically.
Suppose that x is the current income stream resulting from a patent right. This income
can be explicit in the form of royalty revenue, or implicit in the form of increased revenue
from the ability to exclude others from the market. Let p be the patent holder’s belief about
the probability that a court will uphold the patent as valid. If there is widespread belief
that the patent holder will not enforce its property right, x will be small or non-existent
(either because bids for licenses will be small, or because infringement is widespread).
Under these assumptions, the patent can be thought of as a portfolio consisting of two
assets: (1) an asset that pays a stochastic proﬁt ﬂow x,a n d( 2 )a no p t i o nt og ot oc o u r t .
The option to go to court is a put option: the patent holder has the right to sell the current
proﬁt ﬂow in return for the court imposed outcome. Since the patent holder currently owns
3the asset on which it owns the put, it is in a covered position. One can think of the court
outcome as being a money payoﬀ (damages, or a “reasonable royalty” determined by the
court), or as another portfolio consisting of (1) a new proﬁt ﬂow, and (2) a new option to
sue, both of which will reﬂect updated beliefs about the patent.
The strike price of a put option is a speciﬁed price that the ﬁrm obtains from electing
to sell a share of the underlying asset. Here the underlying asset is the current proﬁt ﬂow,
and the price that the ﬁrm obtains is whatever it obtains from the court ruling. Hence, the
strike price is expected damages less litigation costs. The option to sue has ﬁnite life, as
does the underlying asset, and the option can be exercised anytime during its life. Thus,
the option to sue is akin to an American put option on a bond. However, in Section (3), I
discuss the extreme case of inﬁnitely-lived patents.
An alternative but equivalent interpretation of the enforcement problem is one of dy-
namic programming. In particular, we can view the litigation decision as an optimal stop-
ping problem (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). The state variable x is the royalty income from
the patent, or the patent holder’s own beneﬁt from using the patent. If x becomes very low
due to of infringement, then the patent holder will invest in litigation in order to stop the
infringement. Since the ﬁrm can either attempt to stop the infringement now, or defer the
decision, it can be viewed as a dynamic programming problem.
In the formal model, I aggregate the infringement and validity issues into a single matter
for the court. The outcome at trial is winner-take-all, and the patent holder is risk neutral.
In addition, I assume:
1. There is a proﬁt ﬂow z that represents the proﬁt that would accrue to the ﬁrm were
the patent known by all parties to be valid with certainty. z is common knowledge and
c a nb et h o u g h to fa st h ep r o ﬁ tﬂ o wu n d e rt h em o s to p t i m i s t i cc i r c u m s t a n c e s .S i n c e
z is constant, there is no commercial uncertainty. Though I allow for no uncertainty
over scope, z will be dependent upon the scope deﬁned by the patent oﬃce. The
larger the scope, the larger is z (given the same underlying technological value).2 In
this way z becomes a policy variable.
42. Issued patents are of two types: valid and not valid. The patent holder believes that
its patent is valid with probability p.
3. By paying litigation costs c, the patent holder can go to court to obtain an irreversible
and perfectly enforceable decision on validity.
4. The actual proﬁt ﬂow, x, follows geometric Brownian motion with no drift, such that
dx = σxdw (1)
where dw is the increment of a Wiener process. The proﬁt ﬂow follows a stochastic
process (from the perspective of the patent holder) as the beliefs of users vary. The
beliefs vary because of the entry and exit of users, or because there is uncertainty as
to whether the patent applies to a new product group.
5. The patent is inﬁnitely-lived, or has a life of T years.
3 Inﬁnite horizon
In the case of inﬁnitely-lived patents, one can obtain an explicit analytical solution. To do
so, examine the outcome of going to court: at any time t, the patent holder may go to court








in expectation. The terminal payoﬀ from the perspective of time t is the present value (net
of litigation cost, and discounted at rate r) of receiving the proﬁt ﬂow z with probability
p, and losing the patent with probability (1 − p). Since the court’s decision is perfectly
enforceable, the patent holder knows that a validity ruling will lead to a proﬁt ﬂow of z and
an invalidity ruling will lead to a proﬁt ﬂow of 0.
Note that there are no damages for past infringement in the model. This is because
5the trial is instantaneous. In reality, damages can be assessed retroactively so long as the
patent holder was not aware of the infringement. The doctrine of laches prevents a patent
holder from obtaining damages for a period of time during which it knew of the defendant’s
actions yet did nothing to stop them. If a patent holder seeks payment from a technology
user, it typically sends notice making the user aware of the alleged infringement and asking
for compensation. Frequently the date of this notice is used to deﬁne the period after which
damages can be assessed if the dispute goes to court. In the model, the date of notice and
the date of the court’s decision are the same, so there are no damages; the value of the
terminal payoﬀ is in the injunctive right which allows it to prevent further infringement.3
To determine the value of the patent we must solve simultaneously for the value function
and for the patent holder’s decision rule. The value function can be expressed generally as
V (x)=m a x
￿
Ω,xdt+ e−rdtE [V (x + dx)]
￿
. (3)
Equation (3) is the Bellman equation for the dynamic programming problem and states
that the patent value will be equal to the maximum of the termination value (if the option
is exercised) and the continuation value. The function V assumes that the patent holder
will make the current decision optimally, and will also make future decisions optimally.
The value function can be interpreted as follows: over a short period of time dt,t h e
patent holder has the choice to litigate or not litigate. If it litigates it pays c and receives the
expected terminal payoﬀ Ω. Thus the left-hand term in the maximand is the termination
value of the optimal stopping problem, or, alternatively, the strike price of an American put
option. If the patent holder does not litigate, it receives the current income, xdt,p l u st h e
discounted expected value of the patent, where x will change by dx over time period dt.
Importantly, the right-hand term in the maximand is greater than current income by an
amount equal to the option value. The option puts a ﬂoor on the level to which x can fall
before the patent holder sues. Owning the option gives the patent holder some insurance
and protects it against a small x.
6Note that time is not explicitly included in the value function: the inﬁnite horizon
assumption means that the optimal decision at time t given proﬁt ﬂow ￿ x i st h es a m ea s
the optimal decision at time s given proﬁt ﬂow ￿ x. Since the optimal decision rule does not
change over time, and all ﬂows are discounted to the current time period, time does not
explicitly enter the value function.
The solution involves solving for the value function, V (x),a n df o rt h eo p t i m a ld e c i s i o n
rule, x, below which the patent holder will sue. x reﬂects the critical value, or exercise
boundary, between the continuation region of x (where the patent holder does not sue) and
the stopping region.
Deﬁne the patent value in the continuation region as
G(x)=xdt + e−rdtE [G(x + dx)] (4)











Since Ω is not a function of x, the derivatives of the continuation and stopping regions must
be zero at x.
U s i n gt h a tf a c tt h a tf o rs m a l ldt, e−rdt   1 − rdt,a n dE [G(x + dx)] = G(x)+dG(x),
G = xdt +( 1− rdt)G + E [dG], (7)
where the x has been dropped for simplicity.
Ito’s Lemma then yields










From Equations (7) and (9) we obtain a homogeneous diﬀerential equation in x:4





















From an economic standpoint, we know that K2 =0because as x gets large, the option
value of the patent (G(x) − x
r) should go to zero. Therefore the exponent on x should be
negative. K1 is determined by the boundary conditions, Equations (5) and (6).
Solving for x and K from the two conditions yields:










































































σ if x ≤ x
(15)
8Table (1) shows the eﬀects of the model parameters on the value function and the critical
value. A more detailed analysis of these eﬀects is given in Appendices (1) and (2). One
important implication of the model, as far as policy implications are concerned, is that
explicitly recognition should be given to the role of enforceability in patent rights. Much
of the policy debate turns on issues of length and breadth. However, as Table (1) shows,
the probability of validity and variance of beliefs both aﬀect patent value. Rational public
policy should take these factors into account. p and z enter the model symmetrically, and
have the same impact on the value function and critical value. Litigation costs have the
opposite eﬀect: higher values serve to diminish value to patent holders.
In exploring the value function, it is instructive to view the results graphically. Figures
(1) and (2) show the solution for V (x) for the particular numerical values given in Table
(2). V exhibits the usual convex shape in x. Additionally, both the probability of validity
(p) and the level of uncertainty (σ) increase the patent value. The probability of validity
tends to have a larger impact when litigation is likely (low values of x),a n dσ has a larger
impact when x is high, because for a given x, the likelihood of needing to exercise the option
is more likely when σ is high. The ﬁrst and second derivatives of x in Appendix (1) show
that the exercise boundary is decreasing and concave in σ.
However, the dynamics of the exercise boundary are much more interesting in the ﬁnite
case. Additionally, we will need to solve the ﬁnite horizon model in order to examine the
litigation rate.
4 Finite horizon
To account for ﬁnite patent lengths, time will enter the value function explicitly. With ﬁnite
patent length T, the value of the property right decreases over time, so that V (x,T)=0 .
This assumption does not imply that the value of the patented technology is zero, only
that the ability to appropriate that technology using a patent right is zero. Other forms of
appropriation, like ﬁrst-mover advantage, may still be eﬀective.








The terminal payoﬀ in Equation (16) is very similar to that in Equation (2) except that
it depends on the age of the patent, t.W h e nt is near zero, Ω(t) will be almost the same
as Ω (from the inﬁnite time horizon model), since the expiration date is far away. However
as t → T, Ω(t) → 0. In contrast to the inﬁnite horizon case, the critical value x will also
now be a function of t because the payoﬀ to litigating is changing with t.
The ﬁnite horizon version of the Bellman equation is
V (x,t)=max
￿
Ω(t),xdt+ e−rdtE [V (x + dx,t + dt)]
￿
. (17)
I will again deﬁne G as the value of the patent in the continuation region:
G(x,t)=xdt +( 1− rdt)G + E [dG] (18)






And, from Equations (18) and (19):




which is a partial diﬀerential equation in the two state variables x and t. The solution
is subject to the ﬁnite time version of the boundary conditions, plus a third condition
that reﬂects the fact that the asset value must be zero at the end of its life. It is the
third condition that will allow us to use a recursive technique to obtain particular numeric
10solutions.








The solution strategy involves solving the dynamic program using particular parameter
values and the terminal condition that V (x,T)=0 . The terminal condition enables the use
of an iterative algorithm to solve backward for the patent holder’s optimal choices, starting
from the patent’s expiration. I implement the numerical solution by using the standard
approach of discretizing time, and using a binomial approximation to geometric Brownian
motion (John C. Cox 1979).
4.1 Numerical results
I again use the parameters of Table (2) as a base case for the numerical solution, and in
addition I assume a patent term of 20 years. Litigation cost, c, is normalized to one, so
that the value for z can be thought of as a multiple of this value. While litigation cost is
to some degree ﬁxed institutionally, it is likely to vary to some degree with the size of the
stakes. The variance parameter for the equation of motion is σ =0 .4 and the discount rate
is r =0 .1. The eﬀect of the parameters on value are not qualitatively diﬀerent from the
inﬁnite horizon solution, so I focus here on the exercise boundary, x(t).
Figures (3) and (4) show the exercise boundaries over time for diﬀerent levels of p and σ.
In all cases, the exercise boundary hits zero just prior to expiration. For any patent, there
is some ￿ t such that Ω(￿ t)=0provided c>0. After this time, litigation is never proﬁtable.
Because of costly enforcement, the patent’s expiration is eﬀectively shortened to the point
where x(t)=0 .
The graphs show that the exercise boundary is increasing when the patent is young, so
that in all the contours, x(t) reaches its peak in mid-life. Near the beginning of the patent’s
11life, there is an incentive for the patent holder to delay litigation. The reason is that there
is some probability that the state variable, x(t), will rise tomorrow and make litigation less
tempting. This eﬀect is large near the beginning of the patent’s life since there is ample
time to determine whether x(t) will rise or fall. As time passes this eﬀect diminishes and
it becomes more urgent to exercise the option for a given value of x. Near the expiration
date of the patent, litigation becomes too costly and x falls.
Figure (3) shows that higher values of p make the curve more “humped.” Additionally,
patents with low p’s force the exercise boundary to zero more quickly. Those patents will
only be enforced at early ages, while patents with high p’s will be litigated almost until
expiration, conditional on z. The policy implication of this is that the eﬀective term of
patent protection is limited by the probability that the patent is valid. After x reaches
zero, the patent lapses into the public domain. The reduction in the enforceable life of the
patent is an important policy issue that has not been addressed in the literature.
Figure (4) shows that σ one similar eﬀect to that of p:h i g h e r v a l u e s o f σ create a
more humped shaped exercise boundary. However, higher variance also tends to lower the
exercise boundary; This is to be expected since–conditional on a low x(t)–t h e r ei sa
greater likelihood that x(t + s) can reach a relatively high value if σ is high. So, the value
of waiting is higher. The value of σ does not alter the enforceable life of the patent like p.
The general shape of the exercise boundary is robust to a number of diﬀerent parameter
values and stochastic processes. However, with near worthless patents, the exercise bound-
ary is ﬂat (at zero), or decreasing and concave over x. With ﬁnancial options, the exercise
boundary approaches the asset price as the expiration nears, and on the day of expiration,
they will be equal. This is true in the present case with one caveat; in the context of patents,
the underlying asset expires at the same date as the option expires. So, both the asset value
and the exercise boundary must approach zero as the patent nears the end of its life.5
Unfortunately, investigating x in isolation does not inform us about the likelihood of
litigation.
125 Litigation
The expected probability of litigation (the litigation rate) is a function of the exercise
boundary, the initial conditions, the variance of dx, and time. Determining the impact of
changes in parameter values on the litigation rate requires understanding the interaction
of these factors. Consider the probability of validity. If p increases, the exercise boundary
increases. All other things equal, this would increase the litigation rate. However, the initial
value of x is important in this context. If x0 responds to p (which is reasonable–suppose
Ex0 = pz), then the eﬀect on the litigation rate is less clear: the exercise boundary shifts
up, but so does the path of x(t).
For σ, the eﬀect is more opaque. Larger values of σ decrease the exercise boundary.
However, the reason for this is because a high σ means that x(t) can rise more quickly over
a short period of time, making litigation relatively less attractive. Therefore it is not clear
ap r i o r ithat a higher σ will lead to a higher or lower litigation rate.
Last, quantitative impacts on the litigation rate depend–in part–on the deﬁnition of
the litigation rate. One can consider the likelihood of ever being involved in litigation over
the life of the patent; or, the probability of being involved in litigation at some time t;o r ,
the hazard rate of litigation at time t (conditional on having survived to time t).
To be more explicit, given the equation of motion for dx in Equation (1), x(t) is lognor-





. Thus, the natural log of x(t) is
normally distributed with mean lnx0− σ2t
2 and variance σ2t. We can then transform lnx(t)
into a standard normal random variable,






Conditional on not having been litigated, the probability at time t that the patent is litigated
in the next dt interval of time is the probability that x(t + dt) < x(t + dt), which is given
13by the cumulative distribution function (cdf) evaluated at x :
Pr(x(t + dt) < x(t + dt)) = Φ
￿







where Φ is the cdf for the standard normal. The hazard rate could be determined from this
distribution, if a closed form solution for x(t) existed. Without such a solution in the ﬁnite
horizon case, I turn next to simulation results, which will be compared predictions from
patent litigation data.
6S i m u l a t i o n R e s u l t s
For the simulations, parameters were drawn from uniform distributions with the ranges
given in Table (2). For each iteration i, a patent “regime” is determined by the parameters
drawn. The exercise boundary xi(t) is calculated for that regime as described in Section
(4.1). 100 “patents” are then created within each regime with diﬀerent initial conditions.
For the nth patent in regime i, xin0 = kpz, where k ∼ U(.5,1.5). xint is calculated at
discrete intervals of time, and tested against xit to determine whether litigation takes place
at time t.E a c hxint is recorded, along with the parameters and the litigation date (if any).6
The simulated data are used to estimate the hazard rate, h(t), based on the model
parameters. In the ﬁnite horizon model, and also in the actual litigation data below, not
every patent will be litigated by the end of its life. Because of this truncation, I use a
duration approach to estimate the relationship between the parameters of the model and
the hazard. I estimate the hazard function using a Weibull speciﬁcation, because of the
ﬂexibility of the functional form, as well as the ease of interpreting parameters. The hazard
rate for the Weibull speciﬁcation is
h(t,X)=λρ(λt)ρ−1 (25)
14where X is the simulated data, and
λ =e x p Xβ1 (26)
ρ =e x p Xβ2. (27)
In the Weibull speciﬁcation, ρ>1 indicates positive duration dependence and ρ<1 indi-
cates negative duration dependence. If ρ =1 , the Weibull reduces to an exponential dis-
tribution where the hazard is constant over time. The speciﬁcation allows me to estimate
the eﬀects of the model parameters on the hazard rate, as well as on duration dependence.
For instance, it may be the case that higher p increases λ but decreases ρ. Then, for young
patents, higher p may lead to a higher hazard, but for old patents, the hazard actually
decreases below the previous value; i.e., h(t) becomes more skew.
Table (3) shows the results of the estimation. The ﬁrst column gives ￿ β1, and the second
column ￿ β2. I use quadratic forms to allow for ﬂexibility in the estimation of pz, σ, and
forward citations. Since I am not able to ﬁt the parameters of the model using a structural
model, the quadratic form does not limit the analysis. The variables used are those described
in Section (2), with the exception of forward.T h eforward variable is meant to proxy for
forward citations, which are important in Section (7). The simulation data includes data
on xint. The actual value of x is known for each patent at each date prior to litigation.
For real patent data, proﬁt ﬂow is obviously unavailable. However, economists frequently
use the number of citations received by a patent (“forward” citations) as a proxy for value
(Hall, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg 2000, Lanjouw and Lerner 1998). Thus, I slightly obfuscate
the simulation data by transforming xt into a forward citation-like variable.
I assume that forward citations are received when there is “good news” about the proﬁt
ﬂow of the patent. Therefore, I count each “up-tick” in xt as a citation. Letting uint be the
cumulative number of up-ticks at time t for patent n in regime i, Id e ﬁ n eforward as
forwardint = uintpizi.
15Also, note that since p and z enter the model in very similar ways, I estimate the hazard
model using pz as an independent variable. Again, this intentionally blurs the data in a
w a yt h a ti sc o n s i s t e n tw i t hw h a to n ew o u l de x p e c tt oﬁ n di nr e a lp a t e n td a t a .S i n c ep and
z are complementary, explanatory variables may tend to be correlated with the product
rather than the components.
Using the coeﬃcients from Table (3), I predict the values of ￿ ρint and ￿ hint for each patent.
F i g u r e s( 6 )t o( 9 )s h o wb o x p l o t so f￿ ρ and ￿ h graphed against forward, p, z, and σ.7 The
predictions show a median hazard rate of 0.007 per year and median duration dependence
of 7.8. Since ￿ ρ>1, the longer a patent has gone without litigation, the more likely it is
that it will be litigated in the next period of time. However, the value of 7.8 is quite high.
Even the smallest predicted values of ρ are greater than one. Obviously, one should not
infer too much from the quantitative results of the simulations.
The results for forward are most obvious and dramatic. The hump shape for both ρ
and h show that it is not the most valuable patents (those receiving more up-ticks) that
are most likely to be litigated. A common claim in the literature is that litigated patents
are among the most valuable (Allison and Lemley 1998, Lanjouw and Lerner 1998, Lanjouw
and Schankerman 2001). Instead, my results support a diﬀerent hypothesis: that patents
with very few up-ticks and patents with many up-ticks are less likely to be litigated. Those
patents in the middle are the most likely to be litigated and also the have the most positive
duration dependence. So, the longer they remain without being litigated, the more likely
that they will be litigated. This reﬂects what we know from the model: if x(t) is very high,
the patent holder is not likely to litigate. If x(t) is very low, it may be that the underlying
technology is not worth much, or that the probability of validity is small; these are patents
that may never be litigated, which is why the hazard approaches zero on the left tail of
the distribution. So, middle values of forward reﬂect a greater proportion of patents with
a balance of high pz and relatively low x(t).
Turning to Figures (7) and (8), the duration dependence parameter ρ is increasing in
p and z. The hazard rate, on the other hand, is quadratic in p and z, ﬁrst increasing and
16then decreasing. Notably, the highest predicted hazard rates occur when p = .5, which is
consistent with the hypothesis of Priest and Klein (1984) that cases will self-select until
there is a win rate of 50% for the plaintiﬀ. These results support the view that the most
valuable patents are not the primary candidates for litigation.
Interestingly, σ tends to increase the duration dependence, and decrease the hazard rate.
That is, more uncertainty leads to less litigation. This means that for my parameter values,
σ decreases x by more than it increases the likelihood of reaching x.
While these results are provocative, they do not carry much weight without conﬁrma-
tion from testable implications. The results of the simulation are most interesting when
contrasted to the results from the real litigation data.
7 Empirical Results
The data for the empirical analysis come from two sources. Litigation data come from
Derwent’s LitAlert database. The database contains the patent number and date of ﬁling
for most patent suits ﬁled between 1975 and 1995 (approximately 7500). I restrict this set
to patents issued between 1975 and 1995, which are matched to patent data from NBER
(Hall, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg 2001).
Using data from NBER I create a one-to-one matched sample by randomly selecting an
equal number of non-litigated patents. Obviously, there is signiﬁcant censoring in the data
since patents granted in 1995 will, other things equal, appear to be litigated less frequently
than older patents. Because of the censoring, duration analysis is appropriate.
The NBER data contains detailed information about forward citations for each patent.
I use this data to calculate a running total of forward citations by date, up to either the
expiration of the patent, or the date of ﬁrst ﬁled lawsuit. By examining the changes in
forward citations at diﬀerent dates, the censoring eﬀects can be controlled. The alternative
is to use the total number of citations that a patent receives over its lifetime, regardless
of when (or whether) a patent was litigated. This presents a problem. Citations received
prior to litigation are treated the same as those received after litigation. One is not able
17to distinguish between the two. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) term the latter the
“publicity eﬀect,” which may arise because of litigation. By explicitly controlling for the
timing of forward citations and litigation, I can eliminate the possibility of a confounding
publicity eﬀect.
The other patent variables used are patent speciﬁc and do not vary over time. Table (4)
shows the results of the estimation. The speciﬁcation is identical to that described in Section
(6), except that the independent variables are diﬀerent. Besides forward,Iu s ecmade (the
number of citations made by the patent to previous patents), claims (the number of claims
in the patent), gyear (the grant year), and foreign (whether the patent is owned by a foreign
entity). Again, I use a quadratic speciﬁcation in order to allow for ﬂexibility. Since I am
not interested in the precise parameter estimates, this is not a limitation.
The estimate from Table (4) is used to predict ￿ ρ and ￿ h for each observation. The
median hazard rate is 0.09 (per year) and the median duration dependence is 1.7. Just like
the simulation data, the data exhibit positive duration dependence, on average. However,
the estimate for ￿ ρ is less than one for about 10% of the predicted values. Figures (10) to
(13) show the results of graphing ￿ ρ and ￿ h against each of the explanatory variables, except
foreign.
Again, the results for forward are striking. The curves show almost exactly the same
pattern as the simulated forward citations. This result provides some support that: (1)
forward citations are an estimate proﬁt ﬂow (or up-ticks) in proﬁt ﬂow, and (2) that the
most valuable patents are not the most likely candidates for litigation.
Citations made by a patent (backward citations) appear to have some impact on the
hazard rate, but not on duration dependence. Since failure to cite prior art is one of the
common reasons patents are found invalid, it may be that more backward citations decrease
the uncertainty about validity. The eﬀect on the hazard rate is consistent with the view
that more backwards citations indicate less uncertainty about the validity of the patent.
However, the eﬀect on duration dependence does not match the results of σ above. The
eﬀect of claims is equally ambiguous, since it does not have a strong eﬀect in the regression
18results, relative to other parameters. It has been proposed that claims are a measure of the
technological value of the patent (Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001). If so, claims should be
correlated with the parameter z. Because of the weak results, we cannot be sure.
The year in which the patent was granted has a strong eﬀect. There is a consensus
in the literature that there was a signiﬁcant strengthening of patent rights in the early to
mid-1980s (Kortum and Lerner 1999a). In the context of my model, this can be interpreted
as either an increase in p, or a decrease in σ, or both. The shape of the hazard rate over the
grant year shows an increasing litigation rate. According to the simulation results, this is
consistent with a decrease in σ. However, again the slightly hump-shaped curve (even after
1982) in duration dependence is somewhat inconsistent with this interpretation.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigated the eﬀects of uncertainty about validity and costly enforcement
on patent value using a theoretical real options model. I developed both ﬁnite and inﬁnite
time horizon models that examined the eﬀects the parameters of the model on patent value
and the litigation decision. The models make several predictions about patent value in
a world where enforceability is costly and legal outcomes uncertain, and they show that
patent enforcement is a clear application of option valuation.
The ﬁrst model presented was the inﬁnite horizon model. Table ?? summarizes the
results of the comparative statics for patent value and the exercise boundary in the inﬁnite
horizon model. The table makes clear the policy complementarity of (especially) p, z, and
c. This result must be qualiﬁed proportionally to the degree of abstraction of the model.
However, I believe the most fundamental result to be independent of the speciﬁcation of
the model: to the extent that both the scope of the patent, legal uncertainty regarding
that reward, and enforcement costs inﬂuence patent value, policy-makers need to take into
account the contribution of each to total patent value in order to set good policy.
The second model imposed a ﬁnite life on patents. I showed that the eﬀective life of a
patent is increasing in the probability of validity, p. Again, the results must be qualiﬁed
19because of the necessity to impose a particular stochastic process and solve for particu-
lar numeric solutions. However, the result that the eﬀective patent life is shorter when
enforcement is uncertain and costly to be robust to the particular speciﬁcation. Again,
policy-makers need to be aware of all of their policy instruments.
The work of Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990) show that there may
be beneﬁts to long and narrow patents. However, in determining the appropriate level of
reward in a dynamic setting, there may be beneﬁts to shorter patent terms. For instance,
in new patenting areas, like software patents or business method patents it may be that it is
desirable to experiment with intellectual property protection by giving more limited patent
rights in these areas. Policy makers (both the patenting authorities and the courts) can do
so by issuing intentionally uncertain patents. Over time, as the courts and the patenting
authorities deﬁne the validity in these areas, beliefs for certain classes of patents may be
updated (revised upward or downward based on information from related patent cases). In
this way, patents for which the courts and the patenting authorities deem more protection
necessary for optimal appropriation will be just those patents that experience an increase
in conﬁdence about validity. It is more feasible for the patenting authorities to issue vague
patents than to idiosyncratically and retroactively adjust the patent term.8
In the ﬁnal sections of the paper, I compare patent litigation data to simulated litigation
data. I ﬁnd that the forward citation results provide strong support for the model. One
important result that is contrary to the literature is that the most valuable patents are not
the most likely to be litigated. Rather, I ﬁnd that there exists a middle value of patents
that are most prone to litigation. One must remember that the value in this context is a
function of all the parameters of the model, as shown in Section (3).
20Notes
1But note that under certain conditions they may be socially preferable to ﬁnitely-lived
patents if the scope is more narrowly deﬁned (Gilbert and Shapiro 1990, Klemperer 1990).
2See Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990) for economic interpretations of
scope with regard to patent value.
3The injunctive right is a right of property owners. Liability rights alone allow for the
collection of damages, but not for an injunction. Thus intellectual property falls under the
property regime, since the law does not put limits on the owner’s right to exclude others. An
exception to this rule is compulsory licensing which equates to a liability rule: the property
owner is not allowed to exclude, but instead must set some price by which others may use
the property.
4We will see below that in the ﬁnite horizon context, we obtain a partial diﬀerential
equation in x and t.
5Again, this is similar to a put on a bond.
6The simulated data are created this way to match–as closely as possible–the structure
of the litigation data described in Section (7).
7The initial conditions are not plotted, as they have the unsurprising eﬀect of decreasing
litigation.
8This is an application of the evolution of the common law towards eﬃciency (Posner
1992).
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Probability of validity p ++ +
Maximum profit flow z ++ +
Litigation cost c -- -
Variance parameter σ +0-
Interest rate r -- ?
Parameter
25Table 2: Numerical Parameter Values
Base Case Simulation
Probability of validity p 0.7 [0.1, 0.9]
Maximum profit flow z 1 [0.25, 5]
Litigation cost c 11
Variance parameter σ 0.4 [0.05 4]
Interest rate r 0.1 [0.01 0.20]
Term T 20 20
Parameter
26Table 3: Weibull Hazard Estimation: Simulated Data
Variable Coef SE Coef SE
forward -1.02 0.022 ** 0.028 0.0008 **
forward
2 0.01 0.000 ** 0.000 0.0000 **
pz 8.86 0.274 ** -0.077 0.0114 **
(pz)
2 -1.61 0.071 ** 0.031 0.0029 **
sigma -2.41 0.173 ** 0.153 0.0092 **
sigma
2 -0.29 0.068 ** -0.008 0.0020 **
initial -0.80 0.059 **
rate 4.21 0.343 **
constant -13.0 0.3 ** 1.57 0.02 **
Observations 186736
Likelihood Ratio (chi2(8)) 8063
Log Likelihood -555
Notes:
Coeficients are in log-relative hazard form
** indicates significance at the .001 level
* indicates significance at the .01 level
Primary: ln(lambda) Ancillary: ln(rho)
27Table 4: Weibull Hazard Estimation: Litigation Data
Variable Coef SE Coef SE
forward -0.4283 0.0123 ** 0.09635 0.00237 **
forward
2 0.0037 0.0001 ** -0.00140 0.00006 **
gyear -2.0179 0.0960 ** 0.30984 0.03298 **
gyear
2 0.0123 0.0006 ** -0.00174 0.00020 **
cmade 0.0285 0.0030 ** -0.00333 0.00107 *
cmade
2 -0.0001 0.0000 ** -0.00001 0.00002
claims 0.0134 0.0021 ** 0.00007 0.00056
claims
2 -0.0001 0.0000 ** -0.000001 0.00001
foreign -0.9712 0.0356 **
constant 80.3 4.0 ** -13.7 1.4 **
Observations 58311
Likelihood Ratio (chi2(9)) 3746
Log Likelihood -16312
Notes:
Coeficients are in log-relative hazard form
** indicates significance at the .001 level
* indicates significance at the .01 level
Primary: ln(lambda) Ancillary: ln(rho)
28Figure 1: Patent Value, inﬁnite horizon (p)
29Figure 2: Patent Value, inﬁnite horizon (σ)
30Figure 3: Exercise Boundary, values of p
31Figure 4: Exercise Boundary, values of σ
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40A Properties of the Exercise Boundary
Recall that the exercise boundary in the inﬁnite horizon model is given by




The patent holder will decide to litigate whenever the current ﬂow of proﬁt drops below
the critical value x. This reﬂects the patent holder’s belief that it can make more (in
expectation) by going to court than it can by accepting the amount that other technology
users are willing to pay for it. The value of the option is the ability to wait until tomorrow
to see if the state of the world improves. When the option is “in the money,” x has fallen
suﬃciently below pz for the patent holder to be willing to expend the litigation cost and
risk losing the income stream entirely.
From a policy standpoint it is instructive to examine the ways in which the underlying
parameters aﬀect the patent holder’s litigation decision. I do this by way of comparative
statics on x. First, note that for there to be a possibility of enforcement it must be that
pz > cr.9 This condition simply means that the termination value is greater than zero
(Ω > 0). I will assume this throughout; those patents for which pz < cr are unenforceable.
Proposition 1 The critical value x is decreasing in the variance parameter σ, b u ta ta
decreasing rate (x is decreasing and convex in σ).
Dσx =1 6 r
cr − pz
γ (σ + γ)
2 < 0, when pz > cr
Dσσx =1 6 r
(pz − cr)
￿
3γ +3 σ2 +1 6 r
￿
γ3 (σ + γ)
3 > 0, when pz > cr.
Ah i g hl e v e lo fσ implies that today’s level of x will be a bad predictor of tomorrow’s level,
since the percent change in x can be very large. Intuitively, as σ increases, the incentive
to sue is diminished for any given x since the likelihood of x returning to an “acceptable”
level is high when σ is high. In other words, the current level of x is less meaningful when
σ is high: the option needs to be deep in the money before it is exercised. From Equation
41(12), as σ increases without bound, x approaches 0.
The equation of motion for x (Equation 1), depends on σ so the eﬀect of σ on the
litigation rate is not readily apparent. An increase in σ decreases x b u ti ta l s oi n c r e a s e st h e
likelihood that x will drop to a low value, so the eﬀect on the litigation rate is ambiguous.
Proposition 2 The critical value x is increasing over a relevant range of the discount rate
r, and then decreasing, and is concave in r.
Drx =8
σpz − (σ +γ)cr
γ (σ + γ)
















6rcσ +2 crγ +6pzγ + cγσ2 +2 pzσ + cσ3￿
σ
γ3(σ + γ)
3 < 0, for all r.
The discount rate enters in two ways. First, a higher r increases the incentive to sue
because it makes the cost of waiting high. So, if x dips below the expected court outcome
(pz), the one time (expected) gain becomes large relative to the beneﬁt of waiting. However,
ah i g h e rr also reduces the incentive to sue because by paying for litigation tomorrow instead
of today, the patent holder can save by waiting since real litigation costs are decreasing.
For low values of r, the ﬁrst eﬀect is larger; for high values of r, the second eﬀect dominates.
F o rv e r yh i g hv a l u e so fr, x will equal 0 and can technically become negative. Recall that I
exclude that possibility from the analysis because the patent becomes unenforceable (these
cases are uninteresting but not necessarily pathological: from a policy standpoint they may
be very important).
Since the discount rate, r, is not in the equation of motion for x (Equation (1)), changes
in x that are the result of changes in r will be reﬂected in changes in the litigation rate. In
particular, when r<
pzσ
c(σ+γ), increases in r will increase x.T h ep a t ho fx does not depend
on r, so the likelihood that x will drop below x increases as does the litigation rate. In
contrast, when r>
pzσ
c(σ+γ),i n c r e a s e si nr will decrease x and the litigation rate.
Proposition 3 The critical value x is linear and increasing in p and z, and linear and
42decreasing in c.













r<0 for all c.
Note that the marginal eﬀects on the critical value of suing, x, of changes in the probability
of validity (p), the underlying patent value (z), and litigation cost (c) are all functions of
the variance parameter (σ) and the discount rate (r). Ia n a l y z ep, z,a n dc together since
they can all be seen as policy tools.
The probability of validity can be aﬀected by the amount of time the patenting authority
spends examining patents. The more time spent examining patents (and the more the
patent oﬃce hires qualiﬁed examiners), the more likely a patent will be found valid. This
is especially true when validity is attacked on the basis of prior art, the most common legal
strategy (Allison and Lemley 1998). The establishment of pro- or anti-patent courts will
also aﬀect beliefs that a court will uphold validity (Lerner 1994, Lanjouw 1994, Lanjouw
and Shankerman 1997, Kortum and Lerner 1999b).
Since the underlying patent value is aﬀected not only by the technology itself, but
also by the scope of the patent, the patent oﬃce has some inﬂuence over z. Should the
patent oﬃce wish to increase rewards to patent-holders, one option is to increase the scope
of individual patents. Lastly, litigation cost can be aﬀected by policy-makers, at least in
discrete ways. First, the establishment of administrative courts may reduce expenditures
for the initial stage of disputes. Also, the establishment of specialized patent courts should
reduce litigation cost. On the other hand, making appeals easier may tend to raise the
expected litigation cost, since more cases will go through a second adjudication.
We can see from the ﬁrst derivatives of x that the marginal eﬀect of p is linear in z and
43vice versa. So, p will have a larger marginal eﬀect when z is high, and z will have a larger
marginal eﬀect when p is high. This matters from a policy perspective since both p and z
are policy tools in principle.
The eﬀects of litigation costs (c) on x are similar to the eﬀects of p and z except that it
is negatively related to x and the marginal eﬀect is dependent only upon the discount rate
and σ.
44B Properties of the value function
Proposition 4 Patent value is increasing and convex in x in the continuation region.













G(x) is composed of a linear increasing function of x, p l u sac o n v e xd e c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o n
of x, the sum of which is an increasing convex function. The ﬁrst term, x
r, represents the
discounted present value of a stream of proﬁt x. The value of the patent is everywhere
greater than x
r because it is composed of x
r plus a positive amount. Since the exponent on x






, the option value will be lower for higher values
of x,h e n c ew es e eV (x) approach x
r.
Proposition 5 Patent value is increasing and convex in the probability of validity.
From the ﬁrst and second derivatives of G with respect to p,w ec a ns e et h a tt h ep a t e n t























Note the substitution of x in the ﬁrst derivative, and recall that x is a function of the other
parameters, so ∂x
∂p must be taken into account in the derivatives. Also, one should note the
role of z in the derivatives of G with respect to p. The underlying value z serves to linearly
change the marginal eﬀect of p.
Proposition 6 Patent value is increasing and convex in the underlying value.
Value is also increasing and convex in z, as we again see parallel eﬀects in p and z,a s























Because of these parallel eﬀects, policy makers should be sensitive to the current levels
of validity (p) and underlying value (z) if they are to eﬃciently set patent value so as to
appropriately reward innovation. If policy makers desire to increase V most eﬃciently, they
need to be aware of the trade-oﬀs involved. On one hand, a high z increases the marginal
eﬀect of an increase in p and vice versa. So, there is an incentive to increase the smaller
of the two policy variables. However, V is convex in z and p, so there is an incentive to
raise the higher of the two variables. Additionally, higher litigation rates must be balanced
against this policy goal.
Also, higher current values of proﬁt (x) will tend to make the marginal eﬀects of z and p
small. So, if p were raised for all patents, a patent holder who happens to be experiencing a
low draw on x would be made proportionately better oﬀ than a patent holder experiencing
ah i g hd r a w .
Proposition 7 Patent Value is decreasing and convex in litigation cost.
From the ﬁrst derivative of the value function in the continuation region, the marginal
eﬀect of an increase in litigation cost is negative for any value of c. Value is also convex in




















F r o map o l i c ys t a n d p o i n t ,i tm a yb ew o r t h w h i l et oa t t e m p tt oi n i t i a t er e f o r m st h a tl o w e r
litigation costs if policy-makers desire to increase patent value. This will be the case if the
current discount rate is high. A high r increases the marginal impact of c, but it decreases
46the marginal impact of raising p or z. Again, policy makers need to keep magnitudes in
mind when setting patent policy.
47